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Abstract 
              
                 


 



Key Words: Vertical Relationships; Distribution Networks; Contract Design; Two-sided moral hazard. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C12; L14. 
 
                                                 
* I am grateful to the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies – INSEE – for allowing me to use its 
original dataset. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The growing importance of networks is a key trend over the last decades. This evolution involves all 
the fields of economic activity, including retail. The vast econometric literature dealing with the retail 
sector focuses on franchising. This paper extends the analysis to different types of networks, the aim being 
to study the presence of royalties in distribution contracts, which serve as one of the most important 
vertical restraints. 
Vertical restraints are contractual provisions binding an upstream firm to one or several retailers. In this 
way, the upstream firm constrains the action of its distributors. Distribution contracts generally include a 
set of vertical restraints. The monetary distribution of the profit generated by the decentralised vertical 
structure is central to the arrangement. Two main provisions determine the share agreement: the up-front 
fee and the royalty rate. The up-front fee is a lump sum that must be paid by the retailer when entering the 
network. The literature has generally focused on the royalty rate, which defines the share of the retailer's 
profits that the upstream firm accrues. It is usually defined as a percentage of the downstream sales.  
The relevance of agency theory in the study of vertical restraints is now widely accepted, thanks to the 
seminal contributions of  Mathewson and Winter (1983, 1984, 1985) and Rey and Tirole (1986 a and b). In 
addition, the empirical literature emphasises the role of the agency arguments in explaining the 
organisational choices made by the upstream firm concerning its network of retailers. This body of 
literature has been developed since the late 1980s based on U.S. data. Investigations of European data are 
more recent; they include Arrunada et al. (2001) and Vazquez (2004; 2005) for Spain; Pénard et al. (2003), 
Chaudey and Fadairo (2006; 2010), and Barthélemy (2008) for France; Kidwell et al. (2007) for Norway; 
and Pfister et al. (2006) on international data for nine countries. 
This study is based on the theoretical and empirical results on share-contracts in franchising within the 
context of double-sided moral hazard. Using recent data on French chains, I investigate the choice of 
including a royalty rate in distribution contracts. The original dataset goes beyond the strict framework of 
franchising and includes several types of distribution networks. It includes a wide range of retail sectors. I 
provide evidence that whatever the type of network, the royalty rate acts as an incentive device for the 
upstream firm to maintain the brand-name value. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature and sets out the testable 
qualitative prediction. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical specifications. Section 4 contains the 
estimations. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5. 
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2. Survey and Hypothesis 
 
Theoretical background 
 
The literature examines the bilateral contracting relationship between an upstream firm and a 
retailer within a distribution network. This is an agency relationship, as the upstream firm gives the 
downstream party a mandate for the commercial exploitation of its brand. The principal (the 
upstream firm) designs the contract. The retailer’s decision consists of accepting or rejecting the 
contract. Contracts are uniform within the same network; the analysis refers to the « representative 
contract ».  
A moral hazard emerges downstream, as the retailer's effort affects the profit function of the 
principal, who cannot observe this effort. The only observable variable is the result, i.e., the quantity 
sold on the retail market. In this situation, the status of total residual claimant appears to be the most 
effective incentive mechanism for the downstream firm. Subsequently, the share-contract includes an 
up-front fee and no royalties. Once the entry fee is paid, the retailer captures the totality of the results 
from its sale effort. 
However, as shown by Blair and Lafontaine (2005), royalties are common in distribution 
contracts. In agency theory, they have two justifications. The first, initiated by Martin (1988), 
concerns the need to ensure the downstream firm against risk, namely, the hazard on the level of the 
final demand. In that case, the share contract defined by the royalty rate corresponds to a level of risk 
sharing. 
This article deals with the second justification, in terms of incentives in the framework of a 
bilateral moral hazard. In networks based on the renting of the upstream firm’s brand name, a moral 
hazard also emerges upstream because retail sales depend on the firm’s effort. In some distribution 
networks, such as in business-format franchising, the reputation of the network (i.e., the brand name) 
represents the main contribution of the upstream firm. A strong level of brand-name capital favours 
sales on the final market. Building and supporting the chain's reputation is thus a key task for the 
upstream firm. The upstream moral hazard is linked to the fact that the downstream firm cannot fully 
observe the effort made by the upstream firm as it suffers the consequences. In that case, the contract 
also has to contain an incentive mechanism for the upstream firm. The two-sided moral hazard 
context involves ongoing payments to the upstream firm to motivate its efforts in promoting the 
brand throughout the duration of the relationship.  
This bilateral moral hazard situation is the primary theoretical justification for profit-sharing 
contracts in distribution. The theory has been developed from the seminal article of Mathewson and 
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Winter (1985), who proposed the first formal analysis of franchise agreements in the framework of 
agency theory. Their model determines the necessary and sufficient conditions for sharing profits 
between the upstream firm and the retailer. It shows that issues related to risk are not necessary. 
Incentive motivations are sufficient to justify share contracts. In contrast to the employment contract, 
the franchise contract is a much stronger incentive for the retailer, who makes a marginal profit 
directly correlated to its own behaviour. In addition, Mathewson and Winter’s model was the first in 
the literature on monetary terms to incorporate the context of a bilateral moral hazard. This requires 
the assumption of an incomplete contract concerning the franchisor's obligations in terms of 
promotional efforts at a national level. A contract for profit sharing, i.e., where the royalty rate is 
non-zero, is required to solve the bilateral problem of incentives. 
This result is completed by Lal (1990), who models the interaction between an upstream firm and 
its retailer to analyse the role of franchise agreements in the coordination of network members. 
More precisely, the model studies several contexts and shows that royalties are only required when 
the final demand depends on the behaviour of both the franchisee and the franchisor. Therefore, the 
model shows that without a two-sided moral hazard, there is no need for royalties, even with 
downstream opportunism. Thus, the bilateral moral hazard is at the heart of the explanation, and 
royalties within franchise contracts are exclusively justified by the influence of the brand name on 
the final demand. 
A third model, in line with those just presented, is the main theoretical reference of the 
econometric studies devoted to monetary provisions within franchise contracts. Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine (1995) provide a theoretical explanation of the trends in payment rules in share contracts. 
The analysis concerns share contracts in general, of which franchising is a special case. The fact 
underlying these theoretical developments is the uniformity of contract terms within the principal-
agent relationships. In the network, the provisions are generally identical between the principal and 
the different contracting agents. In other words, the payment rules are uniform and stable; this 
characteristic could not be explained by the legal constraints. The bilateral moral hazard model was 
developed to explain these properties, which are considered in a single principal-agent pair at first. 
The model is then extended to cases with multiple agents. It shows that the profits associated with 
the differences in the share-contracts between the franchisees are not high, which is consistent with 
observations. More precisely, the model specifies the conditions for determining the share-
parameter, namely, the royalty rate. The bilateral moral hazard alone justifies the use of royalties, 
which means that this provision is required even for risk neutral parties. The optimal royalty rate 
encourages both the franchisor and the franchisee to invest in their respective inputs (brand 
marketing efforts, sales efforts). In addition, the model shows that the network size does not affect 
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the optimal share parameter. Consequently, the optimal royalty rate is uniform across the 
franchisees. 
Most agency models of franchise contracting imply that the royalty rate is chosen first, as a 
function of incentive and risk issues; the franchise fee is then fixed to extract rents left downstream 
by the royalty rate1.  
 
Empirical background 
 
The two-sided moral hazard explanation of royalties finds support in the econometric literature 
on franchise data.  
Investigating the choice of franchising and monetary provisions, Lafontaine (1992) compares 
several agency models: risk-sharing, one-sided and two-sided moral hazard models. The implications 
on the level of the royalty rate are tested on US data. The multi-sector based dataset relates to 548 
franchisors in 1986. Three Tobit equations are estimated for the royalty rate, the franchise fee and the 
proportion of franchised units. The explanatory variables are proxies for the level of risk, the 
upstream and downstream moral hazards and the capital needs of the franchisor. The results show 
that the data are most consistent with the existence of incentive issues on both sides. The level of the 
royalty rate is inversely related to the involvement of the franchisee and positively related to the 
franchisor’s investment in promoting the brand name. Determinants, such as the risk, the 
downstream moral hazard and the capital needs, are better predictors of the propensity to franchise 
than the contractual design.  
Agrawal and Lal (1995) test the predictions of the theoretical model presented by Lal (1990) on 
primary data for 43 chains and 7 sectors. The aim is to study the impact of the royalty rate and the 
monitoring costs on the involvement of both parties in the franchise relationship. The estimation of 
simultaneous equations shows that the royalty rate realises a compromise between the franchisor's 
incentives to invest in the promotion of the brand name and the franchisee's incentives to invest in 
sales services; the royalty rate positively affects the investment in the promotion of the brand name 
and negatively affects the franchisee's level of effort.   
From US data on about 711 chains in 54 sectors for the year 1997, Brickley (2002) provides new 
empirical results on the determinants of the monetary provisions in franchise contracts, taking into 
account the bilateral moral hazard and risk issues. In the theoretical model presented in a first step, 
the optimal royalty rate increases with the relative importance of the franchisor’s effort and the 
                                                 
1 This conception of the up-front fee as a mechanism for rents extracting from the downstream firm was proposed by 
Rubin (1978). 
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franchisee’s risk aversion. In this context, the royalty provision is described as an incentive device 
for the franchisor and an insurance device for the franchisee. The estimation results of Tobit models 
for the two dependent variables (the royalty rate, the up-front fee) are consistent with the predictions.  
In the econometric literature, Vazquez’s (2005) study is original for two reasons. The first is the 
use of European data. The study covers a sample of 145 Spanish networks in 2000. The second is 
that Vazquez takes into account the profits on the intermediate sales as an incentive device for the 
upstream firm. Two dependent variables are distinguished: the up-front fee and an ongoing payment 
variable combining the royalty rate, the advertising rate and the profits made by the franchisor on the 
intermediate sales to the franchisee. The explanatory variables are a series of proxies relating to the 
allocation of risk, the moral hazard on the franchisee's side, the moral hazard on the franchisor's side 
and the value of the services provided by the franchisor. Two kinds of regressions are performed, one 
by means of an OLS and the other using the Tobit model. The estimates support the explanations in 
terms of risk allocation and double moral hazard and show that the ongoing payment variable 
increases with the significance of the franchisor's effort. 
This result is complemented by Pénard, Raynaud and Saussier (2003), whose work explains the 
proportion of owned units and the royalty rates in French franchise systems. Their estimates of 
Tobit regressions show that the brand value has a significant positive influence on both the 
integration rate and the royalty rate.  
Finally, the econometric literature highlights the impact of incentive issues involving the 
upstream firm on the determination of the royalty rate in franchise systems.  


Testable prediction 
 
The aim of this paper is to enlarge the empirical evidence on several kinds of distribution 
networks based on the sharing of a trademark and considering different types of involvement by the 
upstream firm. Given the analytical framework, it is relevant to predict that the contribution of the 
upstream firm in the vertical relationship is a major justification for the presence of a contractual 
provision establishing a royalty rate. 
For this reason, I propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: the probability of royalties in distribution contracts is positively affected by the 
involvement of the upstream firm in the vertical relationship. 
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3. Data and Empirical Specifications  
 
 
The sample is extracted from a new dataset provided by the French National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies – INSEE. The statistical survey identifies the French distribution 
networks over seven units. It is exhaustive and covers all sectors of the retail trade. The networks 
(i.e., the head-ends) were surveyed by means of a paper questionnaire sent by post. The survey was 
conducted in two waves (2006 and 2008). Finally, 1397 networks are represented in the dataset. 
Usable data are available for 848 of them. The sample consists of the 413 networks of independent 
retailers using the trademark of an upstream firm. I do not take into account i) fully integrated 
distribution networks in which retailers are employees of the head-end and ii) groupings of 
independent retailers that are organised around a buying group but do not share a brand name.  
Table 1 presents the study variables. The presence of a royalty rate in the vertical contract is the 
dependent variable. Table 2 shows that the distribution of this dummy variable is quite balanced 
between the networks whose vertical contractual coordination includes royalties (214) and those that 
impose no royalties (199). 
The core explanatory variables are related to the involvement of the upstream firm in the 
vertical relationship. CONCEPT is a proxy for the transmission of concepts and know-how from the 
upstream firm to the downstream units. More precisely, this ordered qualitative variable is 
constructed based on 4 dummy variables: transmission of know-how, training of teams, initial 
training and regular assistance. Each of these dummy variables is coded as 2 when the upstream firm 
provides this service to the downstream units and 0 otherwise. CONCEPT is the sum of the four 
dummy variables for each network, and it ranges from 0 to 8 in the sample (Table 2). PROMOTION 
indicates whether the upstream firm is in charge of advertising and promotional campaigns for the 
network. In addition, with the renting of a brand name, some head-ends become producers and 
develop their own brands. PBRAND represents the percentage of these original brands in the 
network turnover. LOGIST represents whether the upstream firm assumes logistic functions: storage, 
warehousing, delivery to retail outlets. 
I add four variables to control for the influence of the age, the size, the internationalisation rate 
and the type of the network. The size is the number of outlets in France and abroad. The 
internationalisation rate is the number of outlets abroad divided by the size of the network. As shown 
in Table 2, the sample includes five types of networks, which are classified by the dominant type of 
vertical contract (the distribution is in brackets): networks mainly organised by trademark licenses 
(42), concessions (39), franchised networks slightly mixed with retail units owned by the upstream 
firm (118), highly mixed franchised networks (48) and distribution networks that are mainly 
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integrated (149). To present these different types of distribution networks, I use the following figure, 
based on the classification established by Chaudey and Fadairo (2006), which distinguishes four 
types of vertical relationships according to the degree of coercion for the downstream units. The 
classification proposed here from the INSEE database accounts for five types of networks involving 
independent retailers. The figure establishes a hierarchy based on increasing degrees of integration. 
 
 
Figure 1 - The five alternatives for the variable TYPENET (Type of distribution network): 
 
   Market      Licence           Concession         F. slightly mixed            F. highly mixed      Mainly integrated       Integration                                                                                             
 
           
 
                                                
             
                                    
 
With a licence contract, the retailer is allowed to use a trademark under conditions imposed by 
the upstream firm in order to homogenise the network.  A concession is a contract by which a 
producer enables a limited number of retailers to sell one or several products. This French 
distribution contract is equivalent to traditional franchising in the US case. A European franchise is 
analogous to the US business format franchising. The transmission of concept and know-how is 
central to this type of vertical contract. The INSEE identifies three kinds of franchising networks: 
slightly mixed (over 50% of the network turnover is achieved through franchised outlets), highly 
mixed (between 20% and 50% of the network turnover is achieved through franchised outlets), and 
mainly integrated (over 50% of the network turnover is achieved by owned units). 
The sample covers a wide range of retail sectors. I use the INSEE nomenclature dividing them 
into “strata”. Fifteen strata are distinguished in the sample. The sector-based distribution of networks 
is presented in Table 3. This table shows that the two main sectors are “Clothing retail” (23.24 % of 
sample networks) and “Home equipment” (20.10 % of sample networks). 
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Table 1 - The variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition  
 
Mean         Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
Type 
 
 
ROYALTY 
 
 
Royalty rate included in the vertical contract 
 
.5181598       .5002761          0               1 
 
Dummy variable 
 
CONCEPT 
 
Proxy for the transmission of concepts and know-how 
 
 
6.539952       2.045947          0               8 
 
Ordered qualitative variable 
 
 
PROMOTION 
 
 
Advertising and promotional campaigns by the 
upstream firm 
 
 
1.658596       .5721319          0               2 
 
Ordered qualitative variable 
 
 
PBRAND 
 
 
Percentage of own-brands in the network turnover 
 
 
36.1816         43.63439          0              100 
 
Quantitative variable  
 
LOGIST 
 
 
Logistic functions assumed by the upstream firm 
(storage, warehousing, delivery to retail outlets) 
 
 
1.317191       .8265144          0               2 
 
Ordered qualitative variable 
 
 
TYPENET 
 
Type of network  
 
2.563131        1.355179          0              4 
 
Ordered qualitative variable 
 
 
AGE 
 
Age of the network 
 
 
21.01008         20.59212          0            184 
 
Quantitative variable  
 
SIZE 
 
Size of the network: number of outlets in France and 
abroad 
 
 
167.063           467.9281          7          7770 
 
Quantitative variable 
 
INTERNAT 
 
Number of outlets abroad/ SIZE 
 
 
.1296777         .2289419          0         .9854 
 
Quantitative variable 
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Table 2 - Distribution of networks from the qualitative explanatory variables 
 
 
ROYALTY 
Number of networks Percent in sample 
0 = no 199 48.18 
1 = yes 214 51.82 
Total   413 100.00 
CONCEPT 
0 11 2.66 
1 7 1.69 
2 16 3.87 
3 8 1.94 
4 19 4.60 
5 22 5.33 
6 46 11.14 
7 96 23.24 
8 188 45.52 
Total   413 100.00 
PROMOTION 
0 = no 21 5.08 
1= yes, partially 99 23.97 
2= yes, totally  293 70.94 
Total                 413 100.00 
LOGIST 
0 = no 96 23.24 
1= yes, partially 90 21.79 
2= yes, totally  227 54.96 
Total                 413 100.00 
TYPENET 
0 = trademark license 42 10.61 
1 = concession 39 9.85 
2= franchised, slightly mixed 118 29.80 
3= franchised, highly mixed 48 12.12 
4= mainly owned 149 37.63 
Total                 396 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Sector-based distribution of networks 
 
 Number of networks  Percent in sample 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and automotive 
equipment trade 
14 3.39 
Retailing in predominantly food supermarkets 2 0.48 
Retailing general supply or frozen products in small stores 5 1.21 
Equipment for individuals 29 7.02 
Culture-leisure-sports 28 6.78 
Home equipment 83 20.10 
Development of housing 35 8.47 
Non-food, non-specialised retail stores 5 1.21 
Craft business 15 3.63 
Trade and repair of motorcycles 5 1.21 
Retail sale of food in specialised stores 28 6.78 
Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic devices 9 2.18 
Other retail store specialising in non-food items 38 9.20 
Clothing retail 96 23.24 
Retail shoes 21 5.08 
  
4. Econometric model and estimations 
 
Methodology 
 
The following probit equation is estimated on the full sample (413 networks) and on the sub-
sample of networks where the upstream firm is a producer with own-brands (237 networks). I 
perform robustness tests by constructing additional models, including sector dummies, which are 
included in Equation (1) below. 
             
   
Prob (ROYALTY i = 1Xi)= α0   + α1  CONCEPT i    + α2  PROMOTION i    + α3  PBRAND i    + α4  LOGIST i  +  β1 TYPENET i 
 > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0   
 
+  β2   AGE i    + β3  SIZE i    + β4  INTERNAT i   +
=
15
1s
 γs   SECTOR s i + ε i            (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                          Full sample: i = {1,…413} 
                                                                                                                                          Sub-sample: i = {1,…237} 
                                                                                                                                                            s = {1, …,15} 
 
  
 
α = parameters related to the core explanatory variables  
β = parameters related to the control variables 
γ = parameters related to the sector dummies (robustness tests) 
ε = error term 
i = network 
s = sector  
The expected signs for the core explanatory variables are below the parameters  
 
 
The correlation matrix relating to the quantitative variables reveals no problematic correlation; 
the higher correlation (0.43) occurs between the variables SIZE and INTERNAT (Appendix 1).  
However, the Pearson chi-square tests, which are applied to see if there is a relationship between the 
categorical variables, highlight a potential problem of multi-collinearity (Appendix 2). For this 
reason, I use a step-by-step econometric approach, introducing the regressors gradually. 
I control for heteroskedasticity. When necessary, the standard errors are corrected. 
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Results 
 
 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4 – Probit estimates for ROYALTY - Full sample (413 networks) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CONCEPT 0.213*** 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0408) (0.0440) (0.0451) 
     
PROMOTION 0.463*** 0.480*** 0.498*** 0.469** 
 (0.130) (0.133) (0.139) (0.144) 
     
PBRAND -0.00330* -0.00351* -0.00343* -0.00210 
 (0.00155) (0.00161) (0.00170) (0.00184) 
     
LOGIST -0.244** -0.303** -0.301** -0.228* 
 (0.0885) (0.0967) (0.0974) (0.105) 
     
TYPENET  0.0852 0.0575 0.145* 
  (0.0565) (0.0593) (0.0699) 
     
AGE   0.00461 0.00312 
   (0.00304) (0.00356) 
     
SIZE   -0.0000560 -0.0000891 
   (0.000138) (0.000158) 
     
INTERNAT   0.161 0.0854 
   (0.355) (0.359) 
     
Sector dummies - - - yes 
 
_cons -1.698*** -1.801*** -1.945*** -7.581*** 
 (0.332) (0.338) (0.379) (0.490) 
 
Prob > chi2      
Pseudo R2 
% Predicted 
0.0000 
0.1133 
65.86 
0.0000 
0.1239 
65.66 
0.0000 
0.1275 
67.11 
0.0000 
0.1950 
70.74 
 
Robust standard errors (in brackets) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5 – Probit estimates for ROYALTY - Sub-sample (237 networks) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CONCEPT 0.260*** 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0651) (0.0682) (0.0797) 
     
PROMOTION 0.577** 0.598** 0.595** 0.615** 
 (0.188) (0.195) (0.204) (0.236) 
     
PBRAND -0.00708** -0.00673** -0.00693** -0.00830* 
 (0.00231) (0.00239) (0.00258) (0.00331) 
     
LOGIST -0.113 -0.158 -0.181 0.0916 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.148) (0.184) 
     
TYPENET  0.0213 0.0237 0.0437 
  (0.0795) (0.0836) (0.113) 
     
AGE   0.00287 0.00177 
   (0.00346) (0.00409) 
     
SIZE   -0.0000692 -0.000144 
   (0.000161) (0.000193) 
     
INTERNAT   0.465 0.420 
   (0.434) (0.452) 
     
Sector dummies - - - yes 
 
     
_cons -2.122*** -2.184*** -2.253*** -8.926*** 
 (0.497) (0.504) (0.543) (0.788) 
 
Prob > chi2      
Pseudo R2 
% Predicted 
0.0000 
0.1291 
64.98 
0.0000 
0.1356 
65.93 
0.0000 
0.1342 
67.58 
0.0000 
0.2364 
73.71% 
 
Robust standard errors (in brackets) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
These estimates enable us first to comment on the quality of the econometric models. The 
pseudo R-squared are not very high (between 0.11 and 0.23), which is typical of cross-sectional data. 
The good global significance of the models is highlighted by the chi-square probabilities (which are 
systematically to equal 0), the percentage predicted (between 65 and 73.7), and the area under the 
ROC2 curve: 0.7361 (model 3), 0.7829 (model 4) in the full sample, 0.7272 (model 3), 0.8043 
(model 4) in the sub-sample (see Appendix 3).  
                                                 
2 Receiver Operating Characteristic. 
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The comparison of the estimated models shows that the results are robust.  
With one exception3, the estimates on the full sample provide evidence that all the core 
explanatory variables have a significant influence on the probability that the vertical contract 
includes royalties. These results are qualitatively similar (significance of the parameters, signs of the 
coefficients) on the sub-sample, except for the variable LOGIST, whose impact is not significant. As 
predicted, the transmission of concepts and know-how by the upstream firm as well as its 
involvement in advertising and promotional campaigns for the brand increase the probability of 
royalties. Thus, a high level of involvement of the upstream firm in the transmission of concepts and 
know-how adds 8% to the probability that the vertical contract includes royalties. Moreover, in 
networks where the upstream firm is in charge of advertising and promotional campaigns, the 
probability of royalties is higher at 18% (see Appendix 4).  
In accordance with the prediction, the percentage of the own-brands in the network turnover 
impacts the probability for royalties, but the sign is the opposite of the predicted one. However the 
marginal effects of this variable are very low, which minimises the result (Appendix 4). The 
assumption of logistic functions by the upstream firm significantly influences the probability of 
royalties in the full sample. This is not the case in the sub-sample. Here again, when the influence of 
this variable is significant, the negative sign is the opposite of the predicted one; when the upstream 
firm assumes logistic functions, the probability of royalties decreases by 11% in the full sample 
(Appendix 4).  
Surprisingly, the control variables have no influence here. The age, the size and the 
internationalisation rate of the network do not affect the probability of royalties. In addition, the 
explanation for this monetary contractual device appears to be independent of the type of network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 PBRAND in the model with sector dummies. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In the agency literature, the presence of royalties in distribution contracts is justified by the need 
to insure the downstream party against risk or by the context of a two-sided moral hazard. This paper 
investigates this second explanation using recent data on several types of distribution networks in 
France.  
I fit a probit model of the decision to include royalties in the vertical relationship, depending on 
the contribution of the upstream firm. The estimation results clearly state that regardless of the type 
of network, royalties are justified by the involvement of the head-end in the transmission of concepts 
and know-how and in the promotion of the network.  
The results are more ambiguous concerning the role of the upstream firm in logistic functions 
and the percentage of owned-brands in the network turnover. Their negative influence on the 
probability of having royalties in the vertical contract is unexpected. Concerning the own-brands, the 
explanation may be that the profits on the intermediate sales act as a substitute for royalties for the 
upstream firm. The idea of intermediate sales as an incentive device for the upstream firm, analogous 
to royalties, has been introduced by Vazquez (2005). However, the roles of these two variables 
(percentage of own-brands in the network turnover; logistic functions assumed by the upstream firm) 
in the explanation of the presence of royalties must be minimised; the marginal effects are very low 
(percentage of own-brands), and the results are not robust on the sub-sample (logistic functions). 
The evidence suggests that the contribution of the upstream firm affects the presence of royalties 
in the vertical contract when it is related to the maintenance of the brand-name capital. This is the 
case with the transmission of concepts and know-how as well as advertising and promotional 
campaigns, but not with the profits on the intermediate sales and logistic functions. The significance 
of brand-name capital as a key explanation for royalties appears to be the main result of the paper, 
which is consistent with the previous literature. This paper shows that the explanation can be 
generalised to different types of distribution networks sharing a trademark. 
Finally, attention should be directed towards the range of activities involved in retail 
networking. In this paper, sector dummies are used to perform robustness tests. The estimations 
show that a sector-based explanation for royalties may be relevant, far more than an explanation 
related to the age, the size or the international nature of the network. Further investigations of this 
key monetary contractual device could examine this property in greater detail. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
1 – Correlation matrix (quantitative variables)  
 
 
 
             |   PBRAND    AGE      SIZE    INTERNAT 
     PBRAND  |   1.0000 
     AGE     |   0.0426    1.0000 
     SIZE    |   0.0080    0.0529   1.0000 
    INTERNAT |   0.2341    0.1988   0.4281   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
2 – Chi 2 tests of independence (qualitative variables)  
 
 
           |              PROMOTION 
   CONCEPT |         0          1          2 |     Total 
         0 |         6          4          1 |        11  
         1 |         1          3          3 |         7  
         2 |         0          6         10 |        16  
         3 |         1          2          5 |         8  
         4 |         1          5         13 |        19  
         5 |         4          6         12 |        22  
         6 |         3         12         31 |        46  
         7 |         2         33         61 |        96  
         8 |         3         28        157 |       188  
     Total |        21         99        293 |       413  
 
         Pearson chi2(16) =  96.3875   Pr = 0.000 
 
 
 
 
           |              LOGIST 
   CONCEPT |         0          1          2 |     Total 
         0 |         6          2          3 |        11  
         1 |         3          2          2 |         7  
         2 |         1          3         12 |        16  
         3 |         2          3          3 |         8  
         4 |         5          2         12 |        19  
         5 |         9          8          5 |        22  
         6 |        20          5         21 |        46  
         7 |        33         34         29 |        96  
         8 |        17         31        140 |       188  
     Total |        96         90        227 |       413  
 
         Pearson chi2(16) =  90.7817   Pr = 0.000 
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           |                       TYPENET 
   CONCEPT |         0          1          2          3          4 |     Total 
         0 |         5          1          3          1          1 |        11  
         1 |         2          1          1          1          2 |         7  
         2 |         2          1          5          1          6 |        15  
         3 |         3          1          1          0          3 |         8  
         4 |         4          4          4          0          7 |        19  
         5 |         7          4          4          1          5 |        21  
         6 |         4          3         12          7         18 |        44  
         7 |         9         11         41         12         21 |        94  
         8 |         6         13         47         25         86 |       177  
     Total |        42         39        118         48        149 |       396  
 
         Pearson chi2(32) =  78.3662   Pr = 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
           |              LOGIST 
 PROMOTION |         0          1          2 |     Total 
         0 |        13          3          5 |        21  
         1 |        33         34         32 |        99  
         2 |        50         53        190 |       293  
     Total |        96         90        227 |       413  
 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  50.3430   Pr = 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           |                       TYPENET 
 PROMOTION |         0          1          2          3          4 |     Total 
         0 |         5          4          4          2          6 |        21  
         1 |        21         13         31         12         20 |        97  
         2 |        16         22         83         34        123 |       278  
     Total |        42         39        118         48        149 |       396  
 
          Pearson chi2(8) =  37.1203   Pr = 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           |                       TYPENET 
    LOGIST |         0          1          2          3          4 |     Total 
         0 |        17         16         36          9         15 |        93  
         1 |        19         10         37         10         10 |        86  
         2 |         6         13         45         29        124 |       217  
     Total |        42         39        118         48        149 |       396  
 
          Pearson chi2(8) = 100.2026   Pr = 0.000 
 
  
3 – ROC Curves 
 
 
Full sample  
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Sub-sample  
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4 – Marginal effects after probit 
 
 
 
Full sample  
 
 
 
Model 3                                                                                     
 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]         X 
 CONCEPT |   .0832095      .01629    5.11   0.000   .051284  .115135         8 
PROMOTION|   .1926955      .05268    3.66   0.000   .089454  .295937         2 
 PBRAND  |  -.0013296      .00066   -2.00   0.045  -.002631 -.000028        60 
 LOGIST  |  -.1164834      .03884   -3.00   0.003  -.192609 -.040358         2 
 TYPENET |   .0222772      .02305    0.97   0.334  -.022901  .067456         3 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 4 
 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]         X 
 CONCEPT |   .0796627      .01646    4.84   0.000    .04741  .111916         8 
PROMOTION|   .1790529      .05375    3.33   0.001   .073696   .28441         2 
 PBRAND  |  -.0008013      .00071   -1.13   0.258  -.002191  .000588        60 
 LOGIST  |  -.0871937      .04125   -2.11   0.035  -.168052 -.006336         2 
 TYPENET |   .0554587      .02675    2.07   0.038   .003027  .107891         3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample 
   
 
Model 3                                                                                     
 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]         X 
 CONCEPT |   .0941042      .02305    4.08   0.000   .048929  .139279         8 
PROMOTION|   .2147631      .07114    3.02   0.003   .075331  .354195         2 
 PBRAND  |   -.002501      .00091   -2.75   0.006  -.004285 -.000716        60 
 LOGIST  |  -.0653016      .05481   -1.19   0.233  -.172726  .042123         2 
 TYPENET |   .0085414      .03025    0.28   0.778  -.050742  .067825         3 
 
 
 
 
Model 4 
 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]         X 
 CONCEPT |   .1093163      .02548    4.29   0.000    .05938  .159252         8 
PROMOTION|     .21398      .07749    2.76   0.006   .062098  .365862         2 
 PBRAND  |  -.0028875      .00112   -2.58   0.010  -.005081 -.000694        60 
 LOGIST  |   .0318574      .06292    0.51   0.613  -.091469  .155184         2 
 TYPENET |   .0152037      .03923    0.39   0.698  -.061685  .092093         3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
